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THE REACH OF NEW YORK'S LONG-ARM STATUTE:
TODAY AND TOMORROW
ADo.F HomBUJGER*
INTRODUCTION

T HE Supreme

Court, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,' sanctioned a
state's assertion of judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with
respect to a cause of action which arose from the defendant's past contacts with
the state. Due process, the Court said, "requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of -the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' 2 Single isolated acts "because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission" may qualify as minimum contacts to authorize the assertion of a claim related to them. 3 State statutes which take
advantage of the minimum contacts doctrine (commonly called long-arm
statutes) must therefore conform to the constitutional requirement that an act
which gives rise to the cause of action be committed by the non-resident within
the state. 4 However, not every isolated act within the state supports personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident. The demands of due process are met only "by
such contacts with ... the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the [non-resident] ...to defend the
particular suit which is brought there." 5 An " 'estimate of inconveniences' "0 is
relevant in this connection. Obviously this test of reasonableness and convenience
defies precise definition. It is vague by its very nature and, as Judge Learned
Hand put it, "certainly indistinguishable from the issue of 'forum non conveniens.'
When New York, following a national trend heralded by the International
Shoe case, resolved to expand its jurisdiction over nonresidents it might have
adopted a comprehensive and flexible statute, utilizing the minimum contacts
",7

Professor of Law, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318. See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). While
the International Shoe case involved a corporate defendant, it is generally assumed that the
same standards apply in actions against non-resident individuals. But see Flexner v. Farson,
248 U.S. 289 (1919) which has never been expressly overruled.
4. "However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him. . . . The unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement
of contact with the forum State . .. (Ilt is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v.
*
1.
2.
3.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958),.

5.
6.
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
Id. at 317.
Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1948). See also Latimer
Industries Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949).
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doctrine to the fullest extent. Such a statute might have extended personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to all causes of action arising from an
act he committed within the state. It might also have included causes of action
arising from an act committed anywhere if the nonresident intended or should
reasonably have expected that the act would have consequences within the state
and consequences did in fact result. 8 In order to reduce the risk of unconstitutional application or hardship in particular cases, the statute might have given
the courts wide judicial discretion in taking or rejecting a case. In addition, the
statute might have established specific guideposts to orient judicial discretion,
pointing out factors which are relevant though not necessarily conclusive of the
court's determination (e.g., the applicable substantive law, the convenience of
the witnesses and parties, the accessibility of other fora to the plaintiff, the
state's interest in providing a forum for the adjudication of plaintiff's claim and
the presence of contacts other than that from which the cause of action arose).°
Apparently the legislature felt that the time was not ripe for a statute of
such general sweep. Instead, using the Illinois Practice Act as a model,10 it
adopted a long-arm statute which continues the self-limiting, fragmented approach to single-act legislation, so characteristic of pre-CPLR days." Like the
statutes of earlier vintage, the new long-arm statute covers particular contact
situations and no more. However, it differs from its precursors in two significant
respects: it is much broader than any earlier New York single-act statute; it is
also more indefinite. In fact, it rests on concepts which are so vague and illdefined that no one can tell with any degree of certainty where the jurisdictional
stakes have been set. The inquiry therefore is not merely whether the statute
as applied in any particular case violates jurisdictional due process, but also
whether the statute, as drawn, covers the case. At times this may be a perplexing
task. Specifically, subdivision (a) of CPLR 302 creates a basis for personal
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries as to causes of action arising from any of the
following acts: (1) transacting any business within the state (hereafter called
the business clause); (2) committing a tortious act within the state (hereafter
called the tort clause); or (3) the ownership, use or possession of real property
12
situated within the state.
8. Cf. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249, 267 (1959). The authors suggest legislation providing
generally "that one who does an act in the state or causes consequences there is subject
to the judicial jurisdiction of the state as to all causes of action arising out of the act or
the consequences." But see Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Second, Tent. Draft No. 3, § 84,
comment (1956): "The causing of consequences in a state by means of an act done elsewhere is as yet a largely unexploited and unexplored basis of judicial jurisdiction ....

Since

the act itself was not done within the state, the person's contacts with the state may well
be so slight as to make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction over him unreasonable."
9. See Homburger, Book Review, New York Civil Practice, Weinstein, Korn, Miller,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1222, 1229 (1964),.
10. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1963).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 150-a; N.Y. Ins. Law § 59-a; N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law §§ 250, 352-b; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253(1).
12. Civil Practice Law and Rules (N.Y. Sess. Law 1962, ch. 308, effective Sept. 1, 1963)
(hereinafter cited as CPLR) § 302. The section, insofar as here pertinent, provides:

LONG-ARM STATUTE
The difficulties encountered in interpreting these provisions are hidden by
the deceptive simplicity of the statutory language. Thus, the phrase "transacts
any business within the state" which incidentally has been adopted by several
states, 13 sounds plain enough; yet it raises many questions. Its wording is
uncomfortably close 'to the vague common law concept of "doing business." The
latter phrase is said to refer to a foreign corporation's systematic and continuous intrastate activities which render it subject to unlimited personal jurisdiction in the forum state. 14 Yet, according to the Revisers the phrase "transacts
any business" has an entirely different meaning. 15 The word "any" is said to
make the difference. On its correct interpretation hinges the potency of the clause.
"Any business," it is now generally assumed, should be understood as referring
to any one or more business transactions which give rise to plaintiff's claim for
0
relief whether or not they constitute "doing business" in the traditional sense.'
Finally the word "business" itself is susceptible to various interpretations.
Loosely used, it might denote any voluntary act which has legal consequences.17
But, if given a more technical meaning, it would seem to be limited to commercial
transactions. There are lower court decisions in New York which support the
8
latter constructioi.'
However, there is still much doubt about the requisite nature and quality
of the contact act. The courts have searched in vain for criteria of general
validity in pinpointing the place of a business transaction and its jurisdictional
significance.' 9 In the final analysis each case must rest on its own facts. As in
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries.
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner
as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
13. E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. title 14, § 704 (1965) ; 12 Okla. Stat. § 187 (1964 Supp.);
W. Va. Code § 3083 (1961); Wash. R.C. 4.28.185 (1962).
14. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917). See
Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965), indicating perhaps a trend toward relaxing traditional standards for "doing business" in New
York.
15. See 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. [N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1958, No. 13] 39-41 (1958).
16. E.g., National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960). See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., Inc. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 456, 209 N.E.2d 68, 75 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18 (1965); 1
Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Civil Practice (1963) II 302.07; Currie, The Growth of
the Long Arm: Eight Sears of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 553, 560.
17. See, Homburger, Book Review, supra note 9, at 1226-27.
18. Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1964);
Antique & Period Furniture Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 151 N.Y.LJ., April 15, 1964,
p. 15, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.Co. 1964).
19. For a collection of New York cases dealing with the business clause see Comment,
Transacting Business as JurisdictionalBasis-A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 Buffalo
L. Rev. 525 (1965). See also 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, op. cit. supra note 16, § 302.0609 (1964 Supp.); Thornton, First Judicial Interpretation of the New York Single Act
Statute, 30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 285, (1964); McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 1964 Survey of
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cases involving the question whether a foreign corporation has been "doing
business," precedents have only limited value and outcome predictions are often
difficult. More important than fine distinctions drawn in this or that case seems
to be the court's jurisdictional philosophy and its willingness to break the
narrow confines of the Pennoyeran brand of territorial jurisdiction2 0 which
considers service of process within the state as the foundation of judicial jurisdiction.2 1 Actually, a judgment against a non-domiciliary based on a long-arm
statute stands, at least in one respect, on firmer grounds than one which derives
its validity from the "transient" doctrine of jurisdiction based on temporary
presence. A judgment by default on a claim unrelated to the forum state,
rendered against a non-resident -transient served within the state, depends for
its enforcement outside the state on the full faith and credit clause. It could
never be enforced in a European country since the concept of transient jurisdiction is wholly foreign to continental jurisdictional thinking.2 2 On the other
hand, a judgment based on long-arm jurisdiction has a somewhat better chance
of recognition by certain foreign countries, say France23 or Switzerland, 24 since
these countries are familiar with jurisdictional bases of the long-arm type and
probably could be persuaded to issue an "exequatur" if other formidable
obstacles to the enforcement of judgments rendered by American courts can be
overcome. 25
Upon examining the tort clause it is apparent that in coining the phrase
((commits a tortious act within the state" the statutory draftsmen sketched the
contact requirement of long-arm jurisdiction in tort cases only in its barest
outlines. The rest was left to judicial interpretation. Lower courts favoring a
liberal view found the statutory language broad enough to accommodate cases
at the very borderline of constitutionality, including acts committed without
New York Law, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 419, 430-33; Siegel, A Biannual Survey of New
York Practice,39 St. John's L. Rev. 408, 414-18 (1965) ; 39 St. John's L. Rev. 181, 188-93
(1964); 38 St. John's L. Rev. 406, 407-10 (1964); 37 St. John's L. Rev. 190, 196-97 (1963).
For a review of Illinois case law, see Currie, supra note 16, at 560-79.
20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), made physical presence of the defendant
within the jurisdiction at the time of service of process a prerequisite to excercising personal
jurisdiction and gave the common law doctrine barring assertion of personal jurisdiction
over non-residents served outside the territorial limits of the state validity as a constitutional
rule of due process. The basic idea that the traditional foundation of judicial jurisdiction
is physical power has survived to the present day. See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 450-51, 209 N.E.2d 68, 71, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13
(1965).
21. See Transient Jurisdiction-Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff, A Round Table, 9
J. Pub. L. 281 (1960) (collected essays).
22. See Schlessinger, Comparative Law 213 (2d ed. 1959),
23. See Freed, The Enforceablility in France of American Judgments Obtained Under
American "Long Arm" or "Single Act" Statutes, 1964 Proceedings, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Section
of Int'l and Comp. Law, pp. 212-18.
24. Reverdin, Enforcement of Judgments Obtained Under the New York and Illinois
Single Act Statutes-In Switzerland, id., pp. 240-42.
25. See generally Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments
Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1957).
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the state2 6 resulting in injury to person or property within the state. Support for
27
a liberal approach may also be gleaned from the Revisers' notes.
On the other hand, courts opposed to broadening judicial jurisdiction
beyond the letter of the law discovered strong arguments in the statutory
phraseology for containing the clause within narrow limits. 28 There is enough

in the Revisers' notes to support that view, too. 29 Thus, depending on the
court's taste and inclination the phrase "commits a tortious act within the state"
has been variously interpreted, for jurisdictional purposes, as referring to:
(a) the place where the tort was committed for choice of law purposes-generally the place where the injury occurred; 30 or (b) the place where defendant
1
created a condition of hazard regardless of the place where the injury occurred;3
or (c) the place where potential consequences of defendant's acts, if wrongful,
could be reasonably foreseen 3 2 or (d) the place where the "tortious act" was
33
committed as distinguished from the place where the "tortious injury" occurred.
26. E.g., Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964),
rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
27. "The proposed sections . . . concerning jurisdiction over persons and things and
methods of service, respectively, have been drafted with the following objectives: 1. To
make it possible, with very limited exceptions, for a litigant in New York courts to take
full advantage of the state's constitutional power over persons and things . . . ." 2 N.Y.
Adv. Comm. Rep. [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 13.1, p. 37 (emphasis added).
28. E.g., Feathers v. McLucas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
Co. 1963), rev'd, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964)5 reinstated, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
29. "The only substantial change proposed in the article on jurisdiction is adoption of
a general provision that courts may obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
whose act in the state gives rise to a cause of action.... [Ilt is the culmination of a series
of piece-meal provisions designed to make non-domiciliaries doing acts within the state
amenable to suit in the state....
This section, . . . is designed to take advantage of the constitutional power of the
state of New York to subject non-residents to personal jurisdiction when they commit
acts within the state." 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 37,39 (1958) (emphasis supplied).
In contrast the Revisers of the flinois Practice Act stated: "With the adoption of
[section 17] llinois has expanded the in personam jurisdiction of its courts to the limits
permitted under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ill. Annot. Stats.
ch. 110, § 1-48, p. 165 (Smith Hurd 1963). See also 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York
Civil Practice (1963), ff 302.01.
30. E.g., Lewin v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 42 Misc. 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1964); Fornabaio v. Swissair Transport Co., Ltd., 42 Misc. 2d 182, 247
N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 1964); Johnson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
43 Misc. 2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1964); Platt Corporation v. Platt, 42
Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1964), all following Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435-36, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63
(1961). ("[Tihe place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary
to render the actors liable . . . .") See Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266
N.Y. 244, 248, 194 N.E.2d 692, 693 (1935). But see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120 209
N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d
279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) ; Restatement, Confficts of Laws, Second, Tent. Draft No. 8,
§§ 379, 379a (1963), substituting "center of gravity" test in place of concept that a tort is
committed at the place where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the
actor liable (Restatement, Conffict of Laws, § 377 (1934)).
31. Singer v. Walker, 21 A.D.2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd on other
grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
32. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (3d Dep't 1964),
rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
33. Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 28; Muraco v. Ferrentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247
N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Co. 1964).
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The Court of Appeals has now attempted to bring some order into this
chaos and to delimit the respective scope of the business and tort clauses. It
handed down a decision disposing in one opinion of three pending cases.34 The
first, Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., involved the
business clause; the second, Feathers v. McLucas, the tort clause; and the
third, Singer v. Walker, both clauses. The important lesson to be learned from
these cases is that the arms of New York's long-arm statute are not of equal
length. The "tort arm," which in the light of recent lower appellate court decisions seemed capable of far reach, 85 has been measured to be relatively short.
The "business arm," however, appears to measure much longer than expected.80
THE REACH OF THE TORT CLAUSE: Feathersv. McLucas

The Court of Appeals held that the tort clause of New York's long-arm
statute reaches no further than a literal reading of the statute would justify. The
language of the statute, the Court said, "is too plain and precise to permit to be
read . . . as if it were synonymous with 'commits a tortious act without the
state which causes injury within the state.' "3 In other words, under the
Court's narrow interpretation the tort clause covers only cases where defendant's
"original tortious acts"3 8 (as distinguished from the "continuing condition of
hazard"3 9 created by that act) were committed within the state. Judge Fuld,
writing for the majority, gives no fundamental policy or constitutional explanations for this restrictive view.40 He rationalizes the holding by reliance on the
34. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., Feathers v. McLucas,
Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
35. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964), rev'd,
15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965); Singer v. Walker, 21 A.D.2d 285,
250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964) aff'd on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68,
261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See also cases cited supra note 30.
36. See, eg., Agrashell, Inc. v. Barnard Sirotta Co., 229 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. N.Y. 1964),
rev'd, 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965) (remanded for taking oral testimony of jurisdictional
facts determined below on documentary evidence without a full hearing). Greenberg
v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1964), rev'd,
22 A.D.2d 690, 253 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1964); Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 41
Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1964); Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co.,
42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1964); Curran v. Rouse Transp.
Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 1055, 249 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1964); Lebensfeld v. Tuck,
43 Misc. 2d 919, 252 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1964); Perlmutter v. Standard
Supply Co., 43 Misc. 2d 885, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co. 1964).
37. 15 N.Y.2d at 460, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
38. 15 N.Y.2d at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
39. 15 N.Y.2d at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
40. Judge Van Voorhis in a concurring opinion expressed the view that a broader
interpretation of the tort clause "would be likely to conflict with the Federal Constitution."
15 N.Y.2d at 468, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 27. For cases supporting that view
see, e.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956);
Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Products Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961); Dahlberg
Co. v. American Sound Products, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1959) ; Mueller v. Steelcase,
Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. W. Va. 1962); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960);
Arundel Crane Service, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957). For
cases supporting a contrary position see, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 128
(2d Cir. 1963); Sheridan v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Sup. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
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"plain" language of the statute and by historical analysis. Pointing to the legislature's failure to model its statute on broader provisions existing in other
states, 41 the Court declined to arrogate to itself a creative role in an area which,
it feels, should be reserved for the legislature. The question is not, as the42Court
put it, what the legislature could do or should do, but only what it did do.
The consequences of this self-denying jurisdictional philosophy are brought
into sharp focus by the Feathers case. 43 Two New York residents sustained
serious personal injuries and property damage when a tractor-drawn propane
gas tank exploded on a public highway near their home. They sued a foreign
corporation, not "doing business" in New York, for breach of warranty and
negligence in the out-of-state manufacture of the tank. There was no claim that
the corporation engaged in any business activities in this State. At the time of
the accident the tank was owned by an interstate carrier who used it for the
transportation of the highly inflammable substance in interstate commerce. The
tank exploded in New York while in transit to another state. The Appellate
Division sustained jurisdiction under the tort clause on the theory that "the
Legislature did not intend to separate foreign wrongful acts from resulting
forum consequences."144 The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint:
[P]aragraph 2 of subdivision (a) of section 302 covers only a tortious
[S]ince the
act committed (by a non-domiciliary) in this State ....
tortious act charged against the [manufacturer] ... was committed, if
at all, in Kansas and since, concededly, that company transacted no
business whatsoever in New York, no basis exists in the present case
for subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.45
The Appellate Division, in sustaining jurisdiction had placed much emphasis on the fact that the defendant was a producer of steel products on a
national scale and that it "could be expected reasonably to foresee that its acts,
if wrongful, might well have potential consequences in . . . New York." 40
The Court of Appeals likewise observed in passing that the manufacturer in the
(1961); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960);
Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash.
2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
41. 15 N.Y.2d at 461-62, 209 N.E.2d at 77-78, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
42. 15 N.Y.2d at 459, 460, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 20-21. See also Simonson
v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 287-88, 200 N.E.2d 427, 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438
(1964) ("The formulation of specific rules to implement . . . a standard [of 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice'] seems more appropriately the function of the
Legislature than of the Courts.").
43. 15 N.Y.2d at 458-64, 209 N.E.2d at 76-80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19-24.
44. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d Dep't 1964).
45. 15 N.Y.2d at 464, 209 N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
46. 21 A.D.2d at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The Appellate Division found as additional
facts: "Defendant-respondent, Darby Corporation, [the manufacturer], had knowledge
that the instant tank was constructed for its ultimate consignee, defendant, E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc., a Pennsylvania domiciliary, and was intended for use in interstate commerce;
the defendant-respondent could be expected reasonably to foresee that its acts, if wrongful,
might well have potential consequences in adjoining New York." See Record on Appeal,
Decision of Appellate Division Granting Leave to Appeal, p. 188.
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Featherscase had acted "presumably with knowledge" 47 that the tank would be
used for interstate transportation of the dangerous gas on public highways in
various states, including New York. However, it attributed no jurisdictional
significance to that fact. Having found that other states had used broader language in their long-arm statutes and that the draftsmen intended to subject nonresidents to personal jurisdiction only "when they commit acts within the
state, 4 8 the Court tied its hands by the sterile "plain meaning rule" which bars
any fruitful exploration of legislative purpose.49 In applying that rule the Court
apparently assumed that the statutory phraseology is coterminous with the
corresponding concepts of the law of torts and that a person cannot "act"
within the State unless he is physically present there. It is true that, substantively
speaking, an "act" is the external manifestation of the actor's will, as distinguished from the consequences of that act.50 In the Feathers case the external
manifestation of the actor's will was the defective manufacture of the tank in
Kansas. The condition of hazard created thereby as well as the resulting
explosion and injury which occurred in New York were mere consequences of the
"act." Viewed that way, the statute is "plain." It is far from plain, however, if
one is aware that we are concerned here with a jurisdictional provision; for the
legislative purpose may very well affect the meaning of the statutory language."'
The purpose of the tort clause is clear. It gives expression to the constitutional
contact requirement under the "minimum contacts" doctrine. 2 A "contact" for
jurisdictional purposes may be created by the consequences of an act as well as
by the act itself. The phrase "tortious act," as used in the long-arm statute, could
therefore have been construed, without violence to the statutory language, as
referring to the consequences within the state flowing from an out-of-state manifestation of the actor's will. The inadequacy of a test which distinguishes for
jurisdictional purposes between a tortious act and its consequences is particularly
evident when the tortfeasor, acting without the state, intended the consequences
47. 15 N.Y.2d at 458, 209 N.E.2d at 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
48. 15 N.Y.2d at 460, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
49. "If the language be clear it is conclusive. There can be no construction where there
is nothing to construe." United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1867);
Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)1; Sturges v. Crownenshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 202 '(1819); Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d
167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679 (1951);
Dep't of Welfare of City of New York v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 543, 161 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1959).
50. Restatement, Torts, Second §§ 2, 6 (1965). Restatement, Torts, § 870, comment a
(1939).
51. "If the words be clear in meaning but the objects to which they are addressed be

uncertain, the problem then is to determine the uncertainty. And for this a realization
of conditions that provoked the statute must inform our judgment." Cominetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470, 496 (1917) (dissenting opinion per Justice McKenna, Chief Justice

White and justice Clarke concurring). "It is said when the meaning of language is plain
we are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of ex-

perience than a rule of law, and does not preclude considerations of persuasive evidence

if it exists." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Justice
Holmes). See Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 509
(1940)4
52. See supra pp. 61, 64-65.
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within the state 53 or when the tortious conduct charged is inaction rather than
action. In the former case the intended forum consequences surely establish as
firm a contact with the state as if the tortfeasor had been'present there. In the
latter it is difficult to identify the place where the omission, as distinguished from
its consequefnces, occurred. Was it where the tortfeasor was present when he
failed to act (without the state) or, more likely, where as a consequence of his
inaction a condition of hazard arose or continued (within the state) ?54
THE REACH

BUSINESS CLAUSE: Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., AND Singer v. Walker

OF THE

The Court's construction of the tort clause stands in sharp contrast to its
attitude toward the business clause. In the Longines case, 55 the Court of Appeals
held that the making and performance of a contract within the state, while
significant, are not indispensable jurisdictional criteria. Other activities before
and after the execution of the contract, such as protracted preliminary negotiations through high level personnel, supervision of installation and post-acceptance
testing of complex machinery sold by the nonresident defendant to the New
York plaintiff, may establish the requisite jurisdictional contacts under the
business clause. 56
In Singer v. Walker57 the Court of Appeals went even further. The defendant corporation was an out-of-state manufacturer of geological supplies, not
"doing business" in the State of New York in the traditional sense. Its business
contacts with the state were twofold: (1) shipments of substantial quantities of
geological supplies, f.o.b., from Illinois to its New York customers; and (2)
solicitation of business in New York through catalogues and advertisements
and through a local manufacturer's representative. The connection of these
activities with plaintiff's claim was quite remote. Among the merchandise
shipped to New York was a geologist's hammer which had been defectively
53. See Reese & Galston, supra note 8, at 261, posing the example of a man who intentionally shoots a bullet into a state.
54. See Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1964). Cf. G. Bendict Corp. v. Epstein, 47 Misc. 2d 316, 262 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct.
Albany Co. 1965).
55. 15 N.Y.2d at 455-58, 209 N.E.2d at 74-76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 17-19.
56. "[Elven though the last act marking the formal creation of the contract may not
have occurred within New York, the statutory test may be satisfied by a showing of other
purposeful acts performed by the appellant in this State in relation to the Contract, albeit
preliminary or subsequent to its execution. 15 N.Y.2d at 457, 209 N.E.2d at 75, 261
N.Y.S.2d at 18. This case belongs into the troublesome category of sales transaction involving a New York buyer and a non-resident seller. The business activities in which the
seller engaged in New York comprised: "substantial preliminary negotiations through highlevel personnel during a period of some two months; the actual execution of a supplementary contract; the shipment for use here, subject to acceptance following delivery,
of two specially designed machines, priced at the not inconsiderable sum of $118,000; and
the rendition of services over a period of some three months by two of the appellant's top
engineers in supervising the installation and testing of the complex machines." The court
noted the added fact that the contract itself expressed the agreement of the parties -that it
was to be regarded as having been made in New York and as governed by -New York lav&.
15 N.Y.2d at 457, 209 N.E.2d at 74, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
57. 15 N.Y.2d at 464-70, 209 N.E.2d 80-82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24-27.
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manufactured and mislabelled as unbreakable before it entered the State.
Filling a New York dealer's mail order, the manufacturer shipped that hammer
to New York f.o.b. from Illinois. Plaintiff's aunt bought the hammer from the
dealer in New York and presented it as a gift to the plaintiff who took it along
on a field trip to Connecticut. The hammer broke when plaintiff used it in
Connecticut, causing serious injuries to his eye.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, dismissed the complaint against the
manufacturer for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the cause of action had
neither arisen from the transaction of any business, nor from the commission of
a tortious act within the state.58 The Appellate Division reversed and sustained
jurisdiction holding that the defendant had committed a tortious act within the
state. Relying on a "continuing tort theory," borrowed from the substantive law
and adapted for jurisdictional purposes, the court reasoned:
Because, under the complaint, defendant was responsible for a
continuous act, namely the circulation in New York of a defective
hammer, always bearing its mislabeling, a tortious act occurred in the
state from which the cause of action arose; for the hammer would not
have been acquired in New York except for the undisclosed defect and
the mislabeling; and the occurrence of the harm in Connecticut was
incidental for jurisdictional purposes.5 9
It will be noted that the Appellate Division avoided the rigors of a literal
interpretation of the statute by construing the word "tortious act" as referring
to any of the contacts in the sequence of events, from the original tortious
conduct (the defective manufacture and mislabeling of the hammer) to the
00
moment the dangerous instrument was sold to an unsuspecting customer.
Having thus found a jurisdictional basis in the tort clause of the long-arm
statute the Appellate Division did not consider the question whether defendant
had "transacted any business" in the state and whether the cause of action arose
from it. However, when the case reached the Court of Appeals, the majority of
that Court took an entirely different view:
The mere fact that a product defectively manufactured and misleadingly labeled in one state is marketed and sold in another cannot
serve to change the place where the original tortious acts were com58. Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered in the office of the Clerk
of the County of New York on November 21, 1963 (Justice Jacob Markowitz) in Singer
v. Walker. A prior action between the same parties brought before the effective date of the
CPLR had been dismissed on the ground that the defendant manufacturer had not been
"doing business" in New York in the traditional sense. 15 N.Y.2d at 465, 209 N.E.2d at 80,
261 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
59. Singer v. Walker, 21 A.D.2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (1st Dep't 1964).
60. "It has been recognized that, assuming some causal nexus, jurisdiction, as distinguished from the application of the appropriate law, may rest upon events (contacts)
in between the manufacture of a harmful product and the occasion of harm." 21 AD.2d
at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 222 [citing Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws, 114-18, 587-92 (1962)].
"Because, under the complaint, defendant was responsible for a continuous tortious act,
namely, the circulation in New York of a defective hammer, always bearing its mislabelling,
a tortious act occurred in this State from which the cause of action arose ....1121 A.D.2d
at 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
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mitted or to create a new tortious act .... Accordingly,
diction cannot be sustained ....I"

.

.. juris-

Yet, the manufacturer in the Singer case won only a pyrrhic victory. It
escaped the tort clause of the statute only to be caught by the business clause.
Stretching that clause close to its breaking point the Court concluded:
We hold that the Appellant's activities in this State are sufficient
to satisfy the statutory criterion of transaction of business as well as the
constitutional requirement of "minimum contacts" . .. [W]e do not
deem it determinative ... that the formal execution of [defendant's]
sales contracts may have occurred in Illinois rather than New York.
Nor is it a controlling consideration that the actual injury happened to
take place in Connecticut, since the cause of action asserted is clearly
one "arising from" the purposeful activities engaged in by the appellant
in this State 62
in connection with the sale of its products in the New
York market.
Thus, jurisdiction was sustained by the Court of Appeals on the theory that
defendant had transacted business within the state out of which the cause of
action arose. Neither the fact that the action was in tort, nor that the tort, in a
substantive sense, was committed in Connecticut where plaintiff was injured,
nor that the "tortious act," as viewed by the Court, was committed in Illinois,
nor that "the formal execution of [the manufacturer's] ... sales contracts may
have occurred in Illinois rather than New York, '0 3 barred a suit in New York
under the business clause. In earlier cases lower courts had held that the mere
solicitation of business in New York 64 or shipments of merchandise from without
the state pursuant to orders received from New York6 5 does not constitute
transaction of any business within the state for purposes of the long-arm
statute. And it should be noted that, unlike the long-arm statutes adopted by
other states,"6 New York's statute does not contain a provision conferring jurisdiction with respect to causes of actions arising from a person's contracting to
67
supply services or things in this state.
Chief Judge Desmond concurred in the result, but disagreed sharply with
the majority's reasoning. 8 In his opinion, jurisdiction should have been sus61. 15 N.Y.2d at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
62. 15 N.Y.2d at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81-82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
63. 15 N.Y.2d at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
64. Greenberg v. R. S. P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Co. 1964), rev'd mem., 22 A.D.2d 690, 253 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1964); Irgang
v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1964).
65. jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Co. 1964); see also Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 299 F. Supp 98 (E.D.N.Y.
1964), rev'd, 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965) (remanded for taking oral testimony of jurisdictional facts determined below on documentary evidence without a full hearing).
66. See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27A. 705, 27A. 715, 27A. 725, 27A. 735 (1962) ; Mont.
R. Civ. Pr. 4 B(1) (e) (Civic. Supp. 1965).; Wisc. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 262.05 (Supp. 1965).
See also Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03 (a) (2) (Uniform Laws
Ann. Vol. 9B, 1965 Supp.).
67. 15 N.Y.2d at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
68. 15 N.Y.2d at 470-72, 209 NX..2d at 83-85, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29-31.
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tained under the tort clause as well as under the business clause. In the same vein
as the Appellate Division, he argued persuasively that the words "tortious act"
are broad enough to encompass defendant's conduct in circulating the harmful
product in New York. As he put it:
[T]he totality of an actionable tort such as is charged here (involving manufacturer's product liability) consists of three elements:
defective manufacture, distribution to purchaser, and a resulting
injury. Each of these is a "tortious act"; or in other words, a "part
of a tort."
On similar grounds the Chief Judge voted to sustain jurisdiction in the
Feathers case. 69
EXPECTED FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The following discussion is devoted to two subjects. The first deals with
anticipated jurisdictional developments in products liability cases; the second
with fact finding problems in jurisdictional disputes under the long-arm statute.
1. Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases
The decisions will have a significant impact on the jurisdictional aspects of
products liability cases in New York. Our courts have taken cognizance of the
modern phenomenon of nationwide distribution of many products used in daily
life. Those who come into contact with defective products need protection from
harmful consequences resulting from their use. Whether the loss should be shifted
from the victim to the maker, irrespective of fault, constitutes one of the burning
questions of modern tort law. On the substantive side of the law we have observed the gradual emergence of the doctrine of strict liability clothed in the illfitting garb of liability for breach of warranty without privity.70 On the procedural side there is a corresponding gradual expansion of jurisdictional bases in
the form of long-arm statutes giving victims of product-caused injury access to
convenient fora. While the need for enlarging the jurisdictional bases in products
liability cases is generally recognized, there is much disagreement about the desirable pace and extent of expansion. It is the task of the economist rather than
the jurist to assess the impact upon the national economy resulting from the
exposure of nonresident manufacturers to litigation in places far away from their
business locations. Likewise the question whether products liability insurance
spreading that risk could be obtained at a reasonable expense and whether it
would be possible to pass on that expense to the consumer without affecting delicate trade equilibria, goes beyond the scope of legal inquiry. Whatever the answers may be, the other side of the argument must not be forgotten. If exposure
69. 15 N.Y.2d 470-71, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
70. See cases and materials cited in Judge Van Voorhis' concurring opinion (1 N.Y,2d
at 468-69, 209 N.E.2d at 82-83, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 27-29). See also Keeton, Products
Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. Ill. L.F. 693, 697; Laufer,
1962 Annual Survey of New York Law, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 14 Syracuse
L. Rev. 309, 320-21 (1962).
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to litigation in every corner of the nation is a serious and intolerable burden on
the nonresident defendant, it is even more so on the victim. As shown by the
Featherscase, he may be a person who took no part in bringing the product to the
state. Moreover, he may be suffering from grievous physical and economic disability caused by the product. If as a matter of substantive law the victim has a
right to recover, it is neither fair nor reasonable to emasculate that right by denying him indiscriminately recourse to the courts of his residence-where the injury
occurred. This does not mean, however, that the fortuitous presence of the product and the occurrence of the injury alone should or even could, constitutionally,
be considered a sufficient basis in all products liability cases. While recognizing
the victim's clamour for jurisdictional opportunities, the need for continuing limitations of some kind has not gone unheeded by the courts and legislators. Some
found these limitations to exist in the requirement of a defendant's reasonable
expectation that his acts would cause consequences in the forum state. 71 Others
insisted that jurisdiction must be supported by some other contacts which,
though not amounting to "doing business" in the traditional sense, establish an
72
adequate connection between the forum state and the defendant.
New York's long-arm statute contains none of these limitations. Not even
the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be invoked as protection against
jurisdictional overextension in most cases, since New York is committed to a
rejection of that doctrine in actions brought by New York residents. 73 Thus, when
the Feathers and Walker cases reached the Court of Appeals, it had to choose
among three alternatives. The first was to construe the tort clause broadly, so
as to include not only acts committed within the state causing tortious injury
anywhere, but also acts committed elsewhere causing tortious injury within the
state. The second alternative was to include tortious acts committed without
the state producing consequences within the state, but to read limitations into
the statute which have not been written into it. The third was to construe the
statute narrowly, barring its application altogether whenever the original tortious act was committed without the state. None of these alternatives is wholly
satisfactory. The first is fraught with the risk of unconstitutional application in
cases where products reach the state fortuitously and there is no other reasonable connection between that state and the defendant. The second alternative
poses formidable problems of statutory construction; and the third is self-defeating.
71. See pp. 78, 80-81 infra.
72. See pp. 78-79, 84 infra.
73.

Gross v. Cross, 28 Misc. 2d 375, 211 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Marx v. Katz,

20 Misc. 2d 1084, 195 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 A.D.2d
564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't 1958). See De La Bouilleri v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89
N.E.2d 15 (1949); Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152,
139 N.E. 223 (1923). Generally New York courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine in
commercial cases, Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952); Wertheim v. Clergue,
53 App. Div. 122, 126, 65 N.Y.S. 750, 753 (1st Dep't 1900). In view of recent developments
in the area of jurisdiction, our courts should free themselves from the shackles of this selfimposed limitation. See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice (1963) f[ 301.
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An Illinois court, when faced with these alternatives in Gray v. American
Radiator& Standard Sanitary Corp.,74 chose the first, but left the door open for
an escape from unconstitutional application of the statute. The case involved a
products liability claim against a foreign corporation manufacturing safety
valves. The defendant sold one of these valves to another foreign corporation
which in turn incorporated it into a water heater. The heater later "found its
way" into Illinois where it exploded causing injuries to an Illinois resident. The
court sustained jurisdiction against the manufacturer of the valve under the
Illinois tort clause which reads like the New York provision. Concluding that the
concept of injury is an inseparable part of the term "tortious act," the Court
held that the tort was committed where the injury occurred.76 It supported its
broad construction of the statute by a thoughtful statement of policy considerations favoring jurisdictional expansion.76 However, the court apparently did not
74. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Pre-Longines New York cases following
Gray are cited supra note 30. For cases in other jurisdictions following Gray, see, e.g.,
Sheridan v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Sup. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963); Nixon v. Cohn,
62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963), Articles and comments critical of the Gray case

are cited in Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 463-64, 209

N.E.2d at 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 23-24. For an Illinois decision following Gray grudgingly

see, McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Corp., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. IaI. 1961). The Gray case

has been widely noted. See e.g., 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1431 (1962); 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 103
(1962); 50 Ill.
B.J. 438 (1962); 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 804 (1962). Among New York Com-

mentators are: 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Practice II 302.10 (1963); Thornton,

First Judicial Interpretation of the New York Single Act Statute, 30 Brooklyn L. Rev.
285, 291-92 (1964); McLaughlin, Practice Comments to CPLR 302, McKinneys Cons. Laws
of New York, Vol. 7B at 432; Siegel, A Biannual Survey of New York Practice,38 St. John's
L. Rev. 406, 412-14 (1964).
For decisions in other jurisdictions rejecting long-arm jurisdiction where foreign acts
produce in-state consequences see, e.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Mann v. Equitable Gas Company, 209 F. Supp. 571 (ND.
W. Va.
1962); Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961); Pendzimas v.
Eastern Metal Products Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961); Rufo v. Bastion-Blessing
Company, 405 Pa. 123, 173 A.2d 123 (1961); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D.
1 (M.D.N.C. 1960); Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959). See also
George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cynamid & Chem. Corp. [19441 1 K. B. 432 (English
distributor liable to users of chemicals purchased from New York manufacturer in New
York under contract governed by New York law asserted third-party claim for recovery
over against the New York manufacturer. Held: Order XI, r. I (e.e.), authorizing in
court's discretion service out of jurisdiction "where the action is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction" not applicable since "it does not seem . . . that any tort
was committed within the jurisdiction."); Abbott-Smith v. Governors of University of
Toronto, 45 D.L.R.2d 672 (Nova Scotia Sup.Ct. 1964) (Order XI, r. 1(1) (N.S.) providing
for service out of jurisdiction "whenever the action is for tort committed or wrong done
within the jurisdiction" held not to authorize service outside of Nova Scotia in negligence
action where breach of duty occurred in Ontario although resulting injury was sustained
in Nova Scotia. The court declined to give to statutory phrase "or wrong done" independent jurisdictional significance. But see the opinion of Currie, J., "regretfully" concurring with the other judges because binding authority precluded a broader construction of
the Nova Scotia Rule.
75. 22 Ill.
2d at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.
76. "[Tlhe test should be concerned more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature. . . . [T]he statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted
by the due-process clause." 22 Ill. 2d at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
"The trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis on territorial
limitations and toward emphasis on providing adequate notice and opportunity to be heard:
from the court with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court in which both

74
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feel quite comfortable with the wide sweep of its own conclusions. It guarded
itself against jurisdictional overextension in other types of cases by making an
assumption which, although it was undoubtedly correct, was not backed by facts
in the record. The Court said:
In the case at bar the defendant does not claim that the present use
of its product in Illinois is an isolated instance. While the record does
not disclose the volume of [defendant's] .. .business or the territory
in which appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a reasonable inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other
manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State.
To the extent that its business may be directly affected by transactions
occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, and it has
undoubtedly benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law
has given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves.
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture
of products presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not
matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or
that someone
other than the defendant shipped the product into this
77
State.

Thus, the Court relied on a rebuttable presumption of the existence of
other significant contacts between the manufacturer and the forum state, apart
from and in addition to the injury sustained by the victim within the state.
The burden of overcoming this presumption is on the defendant. To discharge
this burden would be a difficult task for a manufacturer whose products are distributed on a nationwide scale. On the other hand, there is a strong indication
that the Court would have taken a different stand, had this been merely an
isolated transaction involving a local operator. For example, borrowing from
a hypothetical case posed by the late Judge Charles E. Clark, assume that a
local plumber negligently repairs a water heater. The owner of the appliance

later takes it to another state where the heater explodes, injuring a bystander.
Judge Clark concluded that the maintenance of a suit against the plumber in
the state where the injury occurred would violate due process. The plumber
parties can most conveniently settle their dispute." 22 Ill.
2d at 440, 176 N.E.2d at 765.
"With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in
other States. The fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however,
does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that
the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this
State to justify a requirement that he defend here.
"As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use
in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by
defects in those products." 22 1. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
77. 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766. The significance of the court's presumption
of other contacts is stressed in a later federal case, Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200
Fed. Supp. 145 (ND. Ill. 1961). There products of the defendant manufacturer were
shipped to Illinois purchasers f.o.b. from Michigan. The court sustained jurisdiction saying:
"[Dlefendant makes no claim that it did not contemplate the use of its products in
Illinois." 200 F. Supp. at 146.
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"never elected to act" in the other state. 78 It may be assumed that notwithstanding Gray, an Illinois court would reach the same result.
The New York Court of Appeals declined to follow the imaginative but
unorthodox reasoning of the Illinois Court. 79 Instead it simply held that the
tort clause of the long-arm statute does not cover out-of-state tortious acts
causing local consequences. This was radical surgery. It disabled the "tort arm,"
placing all -the work load on the "business arm." In other words, the lack of
intrastate business activities, at least remotely connected with the victim's tort
claim, insulates out-of-state manufacturers of defective products against personal
jurisdiction even if they know or should reasonably expect that their products
would enter the state. On the other hand, if there are significant activities (though
not amounting to "doing business") having some connection with plaintiff's claim
for relief, jurisdiction may be sustained under the business clause even though
the tortious acts as well as the injuries occurred outside the state.
While under the Court's holding, the tort arm of the long-arm statute will
be destined to atrophy in products liability cases involving out-of-state manufacturers, the assumption of jurisdiction will nevertheless be assured in many
cases involving products which enjoy nationwide distribution. These almost
invariably are advertised nationally. Sales promotion within the state by manufacturers and distributors, solicitation of business, and representations in connections with these activities will usually support jurisdiction under the liberal
construction of the business clause.
However, there still remains the hard question of how to deal with cases of
the Feathers variety. Plaintiff there could not point to any business activities
of the manufacturer within the state. He had to rely on the tort clause. For
argument's sake it may be assumed that he had an ironclad case of liability and
damages. Clearly, under conflict of laws rules, New York's substantive law applied. Undoubtedly most of the proof needed to establish liability and damages
was available in New York. There can be no question that New York had a
superior interest in adjudicating this claim which involved two New York resi78. See Deveny v. Rheem Mifg. Co. 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963). judge Clark pointed
out that Vermont's single-act statute would give rise to serious constitutional questions
"had not the Vermont Supreme Court interpreted it as applicable only where the tortfeasor could know that its act might have consequences in Vermont." 319 F.2d at 128.
Judge Sobeloff in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507
(4th Cir. 1956) gives another illustration: "EL]et us consider how a California dealer
might feel if asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates,
knowing that he might be required to defend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit for
refund of the purchase price or heavy damages in case of accident attributed to a defect
of the tires." For a discussion of these hypothetical facts see Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jutrisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 545-60.
79. Cf. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 465, 194 A.2d 568, 571 (1963):
Unlike the Supreme Court of Illinois in Gray . . . we cannot infer that the
defendant's products have substantial use and consumption in Vermont . . . . Our
inquiry is confined to those facts which are established by the record .. . . In the
complaint before us, it does not appear the defendant intended this product for
Vermont, nor that its present or past commercial activity was such that it should
have known that faulty packaging might have potential consequences in this jurisdiction.
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dents who had suffered grievous injury at the hands of a foreign corporation
with which they had no dealings whatsoever. The harmful and dangerous product
had not reached the state fortuitously, but had been manufactured specifically
for use in other states, including New York; and the injury occurred there. Thus
significant contacts with the forum state were present. Yet, the complaint was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If that disposition
was dictated by the narrow wording of the present statute,80 a change should be
considered. It is distressing that a plaintiff (presumably of limited means) pitted
against a resourceful defendant under circumstances like those presented in the
Feathers case 8l should find himself without a remedy in New York, relegated
to seek justice in a foreign state or country. Apparently this feeling was shared
by the Court of Appeals; for there is an intimation in the majority opinion that
the Court would not be averse to a re-examination of New York's long-arm
82
statute by the Legislature with a view of liberalizing the tort clause.
To indicate the direction which a change should take is more difficult than
to establish the need for the change. During the past decade states have experimented with varying success with statutes designed to face squarely the jurisdictional problems posed by products liability claims against out-of-state manufacturers. Their experience is too limited to pass final judgment on the success
or failure of this novel legislation. For example, Michigan's Revised Judicature
Act of 1961 contains a sweeping provision conferring jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries as to causes of action arising out of "the doing or causing any act
to be done or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action in tort.,

83

In a similar vein Montana's Rules of Civil Procedure84 and South Dakota's newly
enacted long-arm statute 5 subject any person to the court's jurisdiction as to
any claim for relief arising from "the commission of any act which results in
accrual within this state of a tort action." These provisions may engender serious
constitutional problems in situations where jurisdiction is based on the mere
87
86
fortuitous presence of a defective product in the state. Minnesota, Texas,
Vermont 8 and West Virginia 9 subject a foreign corporation to jurisdiction if it
80. See pp. 66-67 supra. See also Note, infra p. 181, discussing these cases.
81. The record in the Feathers case indicates that the manufacturer was a corporation
having an annual sales volume in the millions of dollars and employing 400 to 500 people.
It distributes its products on a national scope. See, Record on Appeal pp. 119-21.
82. "Any plea for further expansion of its scope, however desirable such expansion may
seem, is a matter for the Legislature rather than the courts." 15 N.Y.2d at 264, 209 N.E.2d
at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24. At the 1965 Crotonville Conference of Supreme Court Trial
Justices it was suggested that the judicial Conference of the State of New York undertake a study looking toward possible expansion of the N.Y. long-arm statute applicable to
products liability cases. Such study is now in progress.
83. Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27A.705(2), 27A.715(2), 27A.725(2), 27A.735(2), (1962).
84. Mont. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4, B(1) (b) (1965 Cum. Supp.).
85. South Dakota, Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 163, § 2(2) (1965).
86. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (1964 Supp.).
87. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon), Art. 2031b, § 4 (1964) (applicable also to
foreign joint stock companies, associations, partnerships and non-resident individuals).
88.

Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, § 855 (1958).

89.

W.Va. Code Ann. § 3083 (1961).
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"commits a tort in whole or in part" within the state. This provision appears to
be broad enough to cover at least reasonably anticipated in-state consequences
resulting from foreign acts90 although there are also cases holding to the con93
statutes turn on the foreign
trary.91 North Carolina's 92 and Connecticut's

corporation's "reasonable expectation that .. . goods are to be used or consumed in the state and are so used or consumed." This type of statute was declared unconstitutional in one well-known decision 94 while other more recent
cases upheld its constitutionality. 95 Wisconsin has a statute which, in addition
to the local injury arising out of an act or omission outside the state, requires
solicitation or service activities within the state or local use or consumption of
products in the ordinary course of trade.9 6
The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act is drawn along
similar lines.9 7 It distinguishes between "tortious injury by an act or omission
90. E.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Ehlers v. U.S.
Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963); Hearne v. DowBadische Chemical Company, 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1963); Atkins v. Jones &Laughlin
Steel Corporation, 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960); Hutchinson v. Boyd and Sons
Press Sales Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960). Deveny v. Rheem, supra, involved facts
very similar to the Gray case (valve explosion). See pp. 74-75 supra. The Court upheld jurisdiction hut cautioned: "[Tihe act-by a foreign corporation which will subject it to Vermont's
jurisdiction . . . must be one which the foreign corporation could know to have potential
consequences in Vermont." Id. at 128. For cases denying jurisdiction in the absence of
such knowledge see, e.g., O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963);
Mann v. Equitable Gas Company, 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. V. Va. 1962).
91. Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Products Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961);
Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
92. N.C. Gen. Stat., § 55-145(a)(3) (1965).
93. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-411, subd. (c), par. (3) (1962).
94. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (action
for breach of a contractual warranty against a N.Y. manufacturer whose only contact with
North Carolina was the consummation of a contract in New York with the North Carolina
customer and shipment of goods to that state f.o.b. from New York). Accord, Moss v. City
of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961); Putnam v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445, 453-54 (1957).
95. Sheridan v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Sup. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963); Shepard
v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959).
96. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(4) (1965 Supp.).

97. See Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, Uniform Laws Ann.

Vol. 9B (1964 Supp.). Section 1.03, governing personal jurisdiction based upon conduct
provides:

(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly

or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;

(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other

persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this

state [; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this section
may be asserted against him.
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in the state"9 8 and "tortious injury in the state by an act or omission outside
the state." In the latter case jurisdiction may be exercised only if defendant
"regularly does or solicits, or engages in other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered,
in the forum state." 99 It seems that this provision would be of no help in a
situation like the Feathers case which involved a single isolated contact with the
state. 100 In fact, the quoted restrictive conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
would support the holding in the Feathers case. To arrive at a different result,
it would be necessary to construe the clause "or derives substantial revenue from
goods used . . . in this state" in the Uniform Act as including within its scope
the case of a manufacturer who for a substantial profit sells one single item of
merchandise which is used thereafter within the state. This construction might
open the door to a claim of jurisdiction based on the mere fortuitous presence of
the harmful product within the state-a result surely not contemplated by the
Uniform Act. To avoid that undesirable result it would be necessary to make a
further correction and construe the phrase as referring to the sale of one single
item of merchandise intended for use or consumption within the state. In view
of the Court's disinclination to go beyond the "plain meaning" of a statute delimiting jurisdiction,10 ' it is unlikely that the Court would accept this construction, particularly since the word "revenue," if given its "natural" meaning, points
to recurrent income rather than profit derived from one single transaction. The
continuing nature of the nexus which the draftsmen of the Uniform Act evidently envisioned (as distinguished from a contact created by a single isolated
transaction) is underscored by the Commissioners' Notes which refer to "the
regular solicitation of business or the persistent course of conduct required" by
10 2
this provision.
If, on the other hand, the Uniform Act is construed as requiring significant
local business activities, in addition to the tortious injury resulting from a foreign
act or omission, the result in most cases would be the same as that arrived at by
the New York Court of Appeals in the Singer case through implementation of
the business clause. The only practical difference would be that under the provisions of -the Uniform Act no connection whatsoever between these additional
contacts and plaintiff's cause of action would be required. In view of the remote
and incidental relation between the manufacturer's local business activities and
plaintiff's claim that was approved in Singer v. Walker, this difference usually
would have little practical significance.
98. § 1.03(a) (3).
99. § 1.03(a) (4).

100. See Justice Bookstein's dictum to the same effect in Feathers v. McLucas, 41
Misc. 2d 498, 503, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1963): "Under that section [Uniform
Interstate & International Procedure Act § 1.03], it is quite clear that in personam jurisdiction of 'Darby' [the tank manufacturer] by the courts of this state could not be obtained,
under either (3) or (4).."
101. See pp. 66-67 supra.
102. Commissioners Notes to sec. 1.03 (a) (4) of the Uniform Intestate & International
Procedure Act, Vol. 9B Uniform Laws Ann. (1964 Supp.) p. 80.

79

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Occasionally, however, the previously mentioned requirement of a "relationship" would spell the difference between jurisdiction and no jurisdiction. Thus in
Harvey v. Chemie Gruenenthal G. m. b. H., 10 3 Hedi Harvey, a citizen and
resident of West Germany, purchased in Germany tablets containing Thalidomide. She later emigrated to the United States, taking some of the tablets with
her. Thereafter she married, became pregnant and gave birth in New York to
twins allegedly born deformed as the result of their mother's ingestion of the
tablets in New York. The Food and Drug Administration never approved the
sale of the tablets in the United States and they were never sold in this country.
The husband, wife and the twins brought suit in a federal court in New York to
recover damages. 104 The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction upon
the authority of the Special Term decision in Feathers v.McLucas.105 The case
at the present time is pending in the Court of Appeals. 10 0 If in this case plaintiffs could show regular solicitation of business or the persistent course of conduct required by the Uniform Act, jurisdiction could be sustained in a state
which adopted that Act, even if these additional contacts were unrelated to plaintiffs' claim. The lack of relationship would have no bearing upon the court's
power to entertain the action although it might be a significant factor in the
disposition of a motion, addressed to the court's discretion, to dismiss the action
on the ground of inconvenience, as authorized by the Uniform Act. 10 7 On the
other hand, under the holdings in the Feathers and Singer cases, a New York
Court would have no power to exercise jurisdiction either under the tort clause
or, in the absence of any connection between plaintiffs' claim and defendant's
local business activities, under the business clause of the long-arm statute. Jurisdiction could be sustained only if plaintiffs could show that defendant's additional
contacts with the state amounted to "doing business."
Finally, there are the 1959 Recommendations of the Law Revision Commission relating to an extension of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations,
not otherwise "doing business" in the state. 10 8 These recommendations, like the
103. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Chemie Gruenenthal G.m.b.H. forming part of the
Record on Appeal in Singer v. Walker and Feathers v. McLucas.
104. The action was brought in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York.
105. "The record falls short of establishing the requisite agency or continuous, systematic and regular doing of business to amount to those substantial contacts with New York
sufficient to justify the fiction that defendant was sufficiently present within the state to
support jurisdiction in personam. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259 (1917) . ..
I feel obliged to follow Feathers v. McLucas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct.
1963)., and thus rule out in personam jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a) (2)." 63 Civ.
2613, May 15, 1964, by judge Sidney Sugarman, United States District Court, S.D.N.Y.
106. Appeal filed under Docket No. 29048 (2d Cir., June 12, 1964). At the request
of Gruenenthal, the Court of Appeals postponed further briefing and argument in the pending
appeal until after the decisions of the New York State Court of Appeals in the Singer and
Feathers cases. See Gruenenthal's Amicus Curiae brief filed in these cases, pp. 2-3.
107. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.05.
108. N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n, Act, Recommendations and Study Relating to Service
of Process on Foreign Corporations, N.Y. Leg. Doc. 65(c) (1959).
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19
and Connecticut, 110 turn upon destatutory provisions of North Carolina'
fendant's reasonable expectation of consequences within the state:

(c) Commission of any act resulting in this state in death or
injury to person or property, if the corporation expected or should
reasonably have expected that the act would have consequences in this
state;
(d) Production, manufacture, sale, leasing, distribution or delivery of goods or furnishing of services, where the goods or services
are used, consumed, or resold in this state or received in this state for
use, consumption or resale in this state, and the corporation expected
or should reasonably have expected that they would be so used, consumed, resold or received."'
To be sure, absent an authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court, a statute
modeled on -the recommendations of the Law Revision Commission may in particular situations offend against the due process clause of the federal constitution. The dividing line between the new jurisdictional area opened for state
12
penetration by the InternationalShoe1 case and the forbidden zone which still
1
exists under the Supreme Court's holding in Hanson v. Denckla' 3 has never
been clearly defined. More specifically it is not certain, in view of continuing
constitutional limitations, under what circumstances the causing of consequences
within the state by acts committed without the state constitutes a sufficient basis
for exercising judicial jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. While the authorities are divided, 1 4 it would seem that the defendant's purpose or his reasonable expectation to produce consequences within the state furnishes the
fundamental elements of reasonableness, fair play and substantial justice on
11 5
which jurisdictional due process depends.
Granting its constitutionality, the foreseeability test might still invite
criticism on other grounds. It may be said to create problems of proof and to
lack precision. Defendant's state of mind is a fact rarely capable of direct proof.
Whether he intended or expected local consequences from acts committed without the state must be inferred in general from circumstantial evidence. Again a
test based upon reasonable, rather than actual expectation of forum consequences
introduces a vague standard. However, there are outweighing advantages. The
test is flexible and easily adaptable to varying fact situations. It is a kind of
test the courts are experienced in applying (e.g., the reasonable man concept in
109. See note 92 supra.
110. See note 93 supra.
111. The quoted provisions were proposed to be incorporated in a new section 229-a
of the since repealed N.Y. Civil Practice Act. See Act, Recommendations and Study, supra
note 108, p. 3.
112. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
113. 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see supra note 4. See also Blount v. Peerless Chemicals
(P.R.) Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963). Cf. National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 329-32 (1964) (justice Black dissenting).
114. See supra notes 94 and 95.
115. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
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torts or the foreseeability test for consequential damages in contracts). In many
cases the facts leave little room for doubt. Thus in the Featherscase the record
contained ample evidence that defendant acted presumably with knowledge that
the harmful product would be used in New York. Likewise there can be little
doubt about defendant's intent or expectation to produce forum consequences
when he shipped products directly into the state. Usually the test yields results
which accord with our sense of fairness and justice although occasionally it may
lead to unsatisfactory solutions. For example, in Judge Clark's hypothetical
case discussed above, 116 assume that the plumber learned from the owner of
the water heater at the time of the repair that he would move to another state
and take the appliance with him. Would these added facts change the result if
the heater is later taken to that state and explodes there causing injury? The
application of a state statute geared to foreseeability of out-of-state consequences
under these circumstances might create undue hardship for the defendant and
perhaps even be unconstitutional. Of course, there are basic distinctions between
the Feathers case and these hypothetical facts. In Feathers the manufacturer
not only presumably knew of the intended use of the tank in New York, but he
was in the business of manufacturing tanks for use in interstate commerce on a
nationwide scale. The plumber, on the other hand, presumably is a small local
operator whose products normally do not leave the jurisdiction. His knowledge
that the owner of the appliance would move it to another state is merely adventitious, incidental and unrelated to his normal business activities. The facts are
not such as to create a reasonable expectation of litigation in another jurisdiction where the product might cause harm.
At any rate, as other writers have pointed out, it is not possible to draft
even a narrowly worded jurisdictional statute which would exclude the possibility
of unconstitutional application in particular situations. 71 One might expand
this observation by saying that, quite apart from the issue of constitutionality,
even a narrowly drawn statute in this area will at times produce unsatisfactory
results. The way to cope with cases of that sort is not to bar relief in the usual
case where the need for relief is overwhelming. Inequitable results in unusual
and extraordinary situations can be avoided by giving the court a wide range of
discretion to reject jurisdictionally inappropriate cases on the basis of inconvenience. Both the Uniform Act and the Wisconsin Statute contain satisfactory
provisions to that effect. Thus the former provides concisely:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss
the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.1 18
The Wisconsin Statute contains a similar provision to stay further proceed116. See pp. 75-76 supra.
117. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249, 267 (1959).

118. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.05.
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ings and lists some of the factors which the court in the exercise of its discretion
9
may consider when it disposes of the motion."
In sum, the "additional contacts" test of the Uniform Act is subject to
criticism for excluding cases that should be within the scope of the long-arm
jurisdiction; on the other hand, the test based on "reasonable expectation of
forum consequences," proposed by the Law Revision Commission, is generally
satisfactory although occasionally it may provide jurisdictional shelter for cases
that should be excluded. This exclusion could be achieved on a case-by-case basis
by giving the courts wide discretion to decline jurisdiction; but there is no way
of coping with the defect in the Uniform Act, except by a strained statutory
construction that will probably prove unacceptable to our courts. Accordingly,
it is suggested that the foreseeability test is preferable. Another possible solution
might be to adopt the "foreign act-local injury" and "inconvenient forum"
provisions of the Uniform Act, but add to it a provision modeled upon the
recommendations of the Law Revision Commission.
A final word of caution may be in order. Desirable as the adoption of uniform jurisdictional rules designed to clarify, consolidate and improve existing
law may be in general, it is questionable whether uniformity should be the
primary goal at the present time in an area of the law which has far reaching,
largely untested economic and social consequences. As pointed out before, the
experience to date with long-arm statutes is much too limited to pass a reasoned
final judgment on the merit or demerit of the various types of statutory provisions now in force in a number of states. Fundamental policies are still in a
state of formation, taking shape almost imperceptibly in a statute-by-statute,
case-by-case development so typical of the common law tradition. The problem
of constitutionality still looms large. The wholesale adoption of the Uniform
Act at this time-well drawn as it may be-would stifle ongoing state experimentation and smother legislative initiative in individual states. It therefore
should not now be a cause for regret -that, as far as this writer could ascertain,
only Arkansas 120 and the Virgin Islands 121 have adopted the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Act without material change. At least one other state,
Virginia,'2 2 has modeled its jurisdictional provisions governing products liability
claims closely upon the Uniform Act. On the other hand, at least three states
which have adopted long-arm statutes since 1962 (when the Uniform Act was
approved) preferred other types of statutes which appear to be less confining.

119. The Wisconsin Statute lists the following factors which the court in the exercise
of its discretion may appropriately consider: "(a) Amenability of the parties to personal
jurisdiction in this state and in any alternative forum of the parties to the action; (b) Convenience of the parties and witnesses of trial in this state and in any alternative forum;
(c) Differences in conflict of laws rules applicable in this state and in any alternative forum;
or (d) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient,
reasonable and fair place of trial." Wis. Stat. Ann., tit. 25, § 262.19(3) (1965 Supp.).
120. Ark. Stats. §§ 27-2501-27-2507 (1963 Supp.).
121. Virgin Islands Code Ann. Ch. 501, § 4901-4905 (Supp. 1965) (added March 15,
No. 1339, Sess. L. 1965).
122. Virginia Code Ann. § 8-81.2, subd. a(3), (4) (1964 Supp.).
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Thus South Dakota's long-arm statute covers causes of action arising from "the
commission of any act which results in accrual within this state of a tort
action."'1 23 Kansas includes among the jurisdictional bases "injury to person or
property within the state arising out of an act or omission outside of this state
by the defendant provided in addition, that at the time of the injury either (i)
the defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state;
or (ii) products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the
defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary
course of trade or use.' 24 Oklahoma's new long-arm statute is of particular
interest. It adopted the Uniform Act in nomine, but added to it a new clause
which in effect expands jurisdiction to the outer limits of the state's constitutional power: "maintaining any other relation to this state or to persons or
property ...which affords a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
this state consistently with the Constitution of the United States."'2 This provision is as broad as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; it is
also as uncertain in scope and effect. And it reduces the preceding six subdivisions of the Uniform Act, enumerating particular contact situations, to mere
illustrations of the act's applicability. While the Oklahoma statute may be
subject to criticism on the ground that it lacks definiteness and predictability, it
may well be indicative of a national trend in the direction of greater liberality
than espoused by the Uniform Act.
2. JurisdictionalFacts Under the Long-Arm Statute
What are the jurisdictional facts when defendant challenges jurisdiction?
In the ordinary case jurisdiction depends on facts quite distinct from the merits
of the controversy. For example, if personal jurisdiction is based on personal
service within the state, the jurisdictional facts are clearly separable from the
merits of plaintiff's claim. However, since the adoption of long-arm statutes it
has become increasingly difficult to separate neatly the jurisdictional and substantive aspects of a controversy; the transaction or occurrence which gives rise
to the substantive rights may also constitute the basis for personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Consequently, some of the facts underlying the controversy
may have only jurisdictional, others only substantive, and a third group, substantive as well as jurisdictional significance. It then becomes necessary to separate the facts which have jurisdictional significance from those which bear only
upon the merits. Several problems arise as the result of this coalescence of
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts.
123. South Dakota, Sess. L. 1965, Ch. 163, § 2(2),
124. Kansas Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b)(5) (1964). The provision is similar to that of
Wisconsin, supra note 96. It is somewhat broader than the Uniform Act.
125. Oklahoma, Sess. L. 1965, Ch. 144, Art. I, Sec. 1.03(a) (7). Cf. R.I. Gen Laws,
§ 9-5-33 (1964 Supp.), conferring jurisdiction over non-residents "that shall have the
necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island . . . and the courts of this
state shall hold such [non-residents] . . . amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case
not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States."
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In the first place, it must be noted that the court, and not the jury, determines issues of fact for jurisdictional purposes. 1 26 This is so whether the
question arises on a pre-trial motion or at the trial of the merits. Likewise, it
is of no consequence that the issue of fact is common to both the jurisdictional
dispute and the merits.' 2 7 For example, the place where an accident occurred

may have jurisdictional as well as substantive significance. Yet, for jurisdictional purposes, that fact is determined by the court. Of course, findings of fact
made by the court for jurisdictional purposes are not binding on the triers of
the facts with respect to the merits of the controversy1 2s Were it otherwise, the
parties would be deprived of their constitutional right to trial by jury. Also, the
burden and quantum of proof in connection with a jurisdictional dispute is not
necessarily the same as upon the trial of the merits. It is therefore entirely possible that the court finds a fact which is determinative of -the jurisdictional issue
and that the jury, or for that matter, the court when it tries the merits without
the jury, for substantive purposes makes a contrary determination of the very
same fact. While such inconsistency is logically possible and in theory defensible, it is highly undesirable as a matter of policy. A layman would never understand, for example, how the court for jurisdictional purposes, could find that
the owner of a motor vehicle gave permission to the driver to operate it and yet
the jury could return a verdict on the merits against the plaintiff on the ground
of lack of such permission.
Inconsistent findings on identical issues of fact are much less likely if their
determination is deferred until the trial of the merits. There is no inflexible rule
that all jurisdictional disputes be disposed of before trial.12 9 When their deter126. Shippey v. Berkey, 6 A-D.2d 473, 179 N.Y.S.2d 366 (3d Dep't 1958).
127. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 IMI.2d 378, 391-95, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680-82 (1957).
128. Ibid. See also Weinstein, Korn, Miller, supra note 74, If302.09.
129. Former N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 237-a(3) contained an express provision to that
effect:
3. If the plaintiff on the hearing of the motion shall by affidavit deny the facts
alleged by the defendant or state facts tending to obviate the objection, the court
may:
(a) hear and determine the objection and where the court has no jurisdiction
over any cause of action stated in the complaint, the court shall order the service
set aside; ... or
(b) direct that the questions of fact, which shall dearly and succinctly stated
in the order, be tried by a jury or referee, the findings of fact of which shall be
reported to the court for its action; or
(c), overrule the objection, and in its discretion allow the same facts to be
alleged in the answer as a defense.
A similar provision was contained in former N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac. 108. See 16 N.Y. Jud.
Council Rep. 58 (1951). Compare Hittner v. City of New York, 16 A.D.2d 770, 228
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1962) (postponing determination of jurisdictional issue until the trial
of the merits) with Hollander v. Harder Hall, Inc., 13 A.D.2d 835, 216 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2d
Dep't 1961) (directing pre-trial disposition of jurisdictional motion). Undoubtedly the court,
under CPLR 3211 (c), could follow the same procedure. Therefore on a jurisdictional motion
the court could order an immediate trial of jurisdictional issues of fact which cannot be
derided on affidavits or, in its discretion, deny the motion and allow the same facts to be
alleged in the answer as an affirmative defense. This follows from the court's power under
CPLR 3211(c) to treat a pre-answer motion as one for summary judgment and to make
"any order as may aid in the disposition of the action." CPLR 3212(g). Rule 3211(d) contains an express provision to that effect where facts are not presently available to the
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mination depends on contested questions of fact which are interwoven with the
merits and cannot be resolved without oral testimony, or when jurisdictional
issues are identical with those arising on the merits and would thus require the
same factual question to be litigated twice, the jurisdictional question might
profitably be postponed until the trial. 130 On the other hand, there is a strong
policy favoring the expeditious disposition of a substantial claim of lack of
jurisdiction.' 31 Thus, while the court has the power to defer, the question whether
it should exercise it must be answered in the light of the special circumstances of
each case. If the court defers the determination it may at times be advisable to
reserve the ruling until after the jury has returned its verdict on the merits. 1 2
Should the court then dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate
court could, if it disagrees with that ruling, reinstate the verdict without the
need for a new trial.133
We may then return to the question posed initially. What facts must the
court determine when the defendant challenges jurisdiction? The Longines case
makes it clear that under the business clause it is not only proper, but also necessary to go beyond the substantive elements of plaintiff's cause of action in search
of facts which qualify as transaction of business. 13 4 The holding is in line with
prior lower court decisions. For example, it was held in an action for breach
of contract, where the existence of the contract was in issue, that defendant's
undisputed activities within the state in furtherance of a contemplated contract
were sufficient ties to sustain jurisdiction. 35 This would be true even if it should
approving party. This provision should not be construed as limiting the court's authority to
defer the determination in other situations, but rather as confirming it expressly under the
circumstances stated in subdivision (d). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
130. At the 1965 Crotonville Conference of Supreme Court Trial justices the judges
suggested that this practice be followed generally when the jurisdictional facts under the
tort clause are in issue. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) which provides: "The defenses (including
lack of jurisdiction over the person and others] . . . shall be heard and determined before
the trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial." For federal cases construing that rule see, e.g.,
Winkler v. New York Evening journal, 32 F. Supp. 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) (Rule not intended to permit fragmentary and separate trials of issues that require coherent presentation for their just determination); Bowles v. Bissinger, 3 F.R.D. 494, 495 (N.D. Cal. 1944)
(Rule authorizes the court to defer hearing and determination of motion under Rule 12
until time of trial). See 2 Moore's Fed. Prac. 1 1216 (1964),.
131. Hammond v. Hammond, 9 A.D.2d 615, 190 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1959) (per
curiam); See Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and JurisdictionalMotions in New York, 14
Buffalo L. Rev. 374, 400-06 (1965).
132. See Scott v. Pennsylvania, 8 F.R.D. 548 (D.C. Pa. 1949)(Court refused to
entertain motion to dismiss negligence action on ground of lack of jurisdictional amount
until time of trial after plaintiff's evidence was in or even after verdict was returned).
133. The suggested practice is analogous to that frequently used where a party moves
for directed verdict. The court could use the same jury which decides the merits as advisory
jury on the jurisdictional issue. See Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Practice ff 4212.08
(1963). However, it would be reversible error if the court treated the advisory findings of
that jury as binding. See Ruder v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 18 A.D.2d 763, 235 N.Y.S.2d
191 (4th Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision).
134. See p. 69 supra.
135. Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct.
Erie Co. 1964).
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develop later on in the trial that no contract was ever made and therefore a judgment must be rendered on the merits for the defendant.
More problematical is the construction of the tort clause in this context.
Is it sufficient to show that the defendant committed an act in New York alleged
to be tortious or does the statute require more? In Illinois it was held that
"jurisdiction depends not upon an ultimate finding after trial on the merits that
defendant is liable to plaintiff but upon a preliminary finding by the court . ..
that the defendant personally or through an agent, is the author of acts or
omissions within the state, and [that] the complaint states a cause of action in
tort arising from such conduct."'1 6 It should be noted in this connection that the
burden of proof with respect to jurisdictional facts, once the defendant has
37
challenged jurisdiction, is on the plaintiff.
The approach of the Illinois Court has a serious drawback. It compels a
resident of another state or country to appear as a defendant and litigate unmeritorious claims with no substance behind it. Once plaintiff shows a "contact"'18 with the state through a local act or, in some jurisdictions, through local
consequences and alleges a good cause of action based on that contact, -the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction even though the claim may be sham.
In view of the New York Court of Appeals' inclination toward a more literal
reading of the tort clause, it is not impossible that it will refuse to follow the
interpretation of the Illinois court in this respect. That does not mean that the
plaintiff, in order to establish jurisdiction, would have -to prove all the substantive elements of plaintiff's cause of action. As Judge VanVoorhis pointed out in
his concurring opinion in the Longines case it should suffice that "without
prejudice to the determination of the question of liability at the trial, enough
has been shown to indicate the existence of a substantial controversy which, if
resolved in plaintiff's favor on the facts and the law, would warrant the assump9
tion of jurisdiction . . .
CONCLUSION

The decision in the Longines case will undoubtedly provoke much debate
in this state and elsewhere. Whether approved or condemned, it will have at
least one fortunate consequence. The task of predicting results in jurisdictional
disputes has become somewhat easier since the Court of Appeals has spoken.
136. Nelson v. Miller, 11 III. 2d 378, 393, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957).
137. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Hansen v.
American Security & Trust Co., 159 App. Div. 801, 144 N.Y.Supp. 839 (1st Dep't 1913);
Willcox v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 136 App. Div. 626, 121 N.Y.Supp. 368 (lst Dep't
1910); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Company, 229 F. Supp. 98, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1964),
rev'd, 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965) (remanded for taking oral testimony of jurisdictional
facts determined below on documentary evidence without a full hearing). Magnaflux Corporation v. Foerster, 223 F. Supp. 552, 565 (N.D. Ill.
1963); Eastern Products Corp. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron R. Co., 102 Misc. 557, 170 N.Y.Supp. 100 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1918).
138.

Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957),

does not indicate the

quantum of proof required to show the "contact facts" on which his cause of action rests.
139. 15 N.Y.2d at 469, 209 N.E.2d at 83, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
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Moreover, the stage has been set for legislative efforts in furtherance of a better,
clearer, and perhaps more comprehensive long-arm statute than the one now
existent.
Until the law has been changed, the legal profession must learn to live with
the rule as declared by the Court of Appeals. The lawyer who wants to bring an
action in a New York court to recover damages for tortious in-state injury resulting from acts or omissions without the state must look to the business clause
of the long-arm statute for his jurisdictional salvation. The tort clause will be of
no avail. Thus his investigatory task will be increased considerably. In addition
to securing proof relating to the substantive elements of his client's claim, he
must search for and find business contacts between the State and the defendant,
connected with the cause of action and sufficient to support jurisdiction.

